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Tato práce je studií o integrovaném sběru a zpracování bezpečnostních dat pro organizace 
údržby letadel. 
Klíčovým prvkem shromažďování a zpracování bezpečnostních dat obecně je jasně definovaná 
taxonomie. Z tohoto důvodu se tahle práce také pozorně zaměřuje na rozbor taxonomií 
vyvinutých pro účely sběru a zpracování dat v letecké údržbě, jako jsou MEDA nebo 
ECCAIRS. 
Po shrnutí existujících způsobů sběru informací, postupů při jejich zpracování a taxonomií 
souvisejících s leteckou údržbou je navržena konkrétní forma integrovaného sběru a zpracovaní 
dat aplikovatelná pro organizace údržby letadel. 
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This thesis is a study on integrated safety data collection and processing for aircraft maintenance 
organisations. 
The key element of safety data collection and processing is clearly defined taxonomy. Hence, 
this thesis also closely looks at existing aircraft maintenance taxonomies developed for data 
collection and processing purposes, like MEDA or ECCAIRS. 
After the review of existing data collections along with data processing procedures and 
maintenance taxonomies, a particular integrated safety data collection applicable to 
maintenance organisations is proposed. 
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Introduction 
 
Air transport is undeniably one of the safest ways to travel around the globe. This is proved by 
many statistics taken each year. But despite this fact, when an aircraft accident occurs the 
consequences can be devastating and usually impact not only the lives of humans, but the whole 
aviation industry as it is. The safety should therefore never be underestimated. 
Technology and materials used on aircraft are nowadays undoubtedly highly advanced and safe. 
Chances that the technology fails by itself are quite narrow. Even if it does, predictive systems 
designed to monitor its current and future state can grab this information in time. But even the 
most state-of-the-art technology does not ensure safe aviation environment. Aviation is still 
strongly impacted by humans and their actions. No matter how trained someone is, making 
errors is an inseparable part of human nature. As long as human interaction is involved, air 
transport can never be free of such errors. 
ICAO, FAA or EASA understand this and initiatives to make flying even safer are taken each 
year by developing new ways to improve safety. One of those ways is developing and 
implementing an integrated safety data collection and processing system within an organisation. 
This system is founded on a common, well-developed taxonomy used for occurrence 
classification. Using such taxonomy is essential in improving quality of safety data collection 
and processing and hence improving aviation safety. Having uniform sets of terms and phrases 
helps providers gather relevant data about occurrences and see which occurrences cumulate and 
why. If unsure how to properly deal with such accumulation, exchanging safety data with 
providers from other states can be of great value. Other providers might have implemented 
useful measures to reduce the same occurrences and sharing this information could help others. 
In spite of many benefits a common, uniform taxonomy offers, it was not widely recognized by 
the whole aviation industry yet. Although some taxonomies have already been developed, like 
the one ECCAIRS is built on, they are not applicable to all service providers. There is no doubt 
that aviation providers such as aerodromes, air transport operators and air navigation services 
are the key players in air transport and require the highest level of safety. But constant safety 
improvements should be desired in all sectors of aviation industry equally, as other players 
might affect the level of safety as well. 
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One of such players are approved maintenance organisations. Several papers and publications 
were issued in recent years on how to manage safety properly in approved maintenance 
organisations. This thesis can be considered as a follow-up on such publications. 
Improving safety in maintenance organisations can be challenging. Maintenance providers are 
even more susceptible to human error, because the quality of aircraft maintenance is not 
dependent on technology as much as it is on the level of personnel expertise and their ability to 
perform safely. Human-error related occurrences are not easy to control and predict. Mistakes 
just happen, even to the best mechanics always following a checklist. 
One way to achieve a safer environment in aircraft maintenance organisation is to follow other 
aviation service providers and develop and implement an integrated safety data collection and 
processing system. For such system in maintenance organisations, the use of a common 
taxonomy is of same importance as in any other aviation organisation. 
Step by step, this thesis firstly reviews existing taxonomies that utilise terms applicable to 
aircraft maintenance. Further on, the thesis analyses means to collect and process safety data. 
After summarising the above, an enhanced system for safety data collection and processing 
applicable to maintenance organisations is proposed. 
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1   Analysis of taxonomies used in the domain of aircraft maintenance 
 
1.1   Preface 
In aviation, taxonomy refers to a set of definitions and descriptions used for gathering and 
reporting occurrence data into reporting tools. In aircraft maintenance repair organisations 
(MROs), taxonomies should contain specific terms that are applicable to MRO operation 
processes and that all persons required to report and analyse these data understand what these 
terms mean in order to correctly report and classify any occurrence. 
Currently, there are two main sources of taxonomies intended for aviation maintenance. First 
taxonomy is contained in MEDA methodology; the second taxonomy comes from ECCAIRS. 
 
1.2   MEDA 
1.2.1   General philosophy 
Maintenance Error Decision Aid, or MEDA, is “a structured process used to investigate events 
caused by mechanic inspector performance developed by Boeing [1].” It is an event-based 
investigation process meaning the investigation starts after the event occurred. Maintenance 
human error related events, approximately 80% of all maintenance related accidents [2], are 
either caused unintentionally (errors), intentionally (violations), or by combination of the two. 
Initially, MEDA was developed as an error investigation process, but since violations too play 
a role in causing a maintenance related event, MEDA is now described as an event investigation 
process. 
MEDA stands on the philosophy that behind any event there is an error/violation, and behind 
any error/violation there is (are) contributing factor(s). Contributing factors are to be understood 
as conditions that contribute to an error/violation, which is basically anything that affects how 
a mechanic does his/her job. For one error/violation to occur several contributing factors might 
exist, and for these factors to occur another factors could have contributed. This causation 
model is displayed in Figure 1 on the next page. 
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Probability is the main causation linking two occurrences in maintenance event investigation. 
This applies to contributing factors leading to error/violation or errors/violations leading to 
event. Experience has shown that there are approximately three to four contributing factors to 
each error. 
 
Figure 1. MEDA Error and violation model [1] 
 
To give an example for the above model, a mechanic performing his job is considered. The 
mechanic does not use a torque wrench, which is a required procedure step, and therefore the 
mechanic violates the procedure. Factors that contributed to this violation might include torque 
wrench not being available in time, or not using torque wrench being a group norm. The 
violation then contributes to an incorrect installation (system failure) because of an under-
torqued bolt, which eventually leads to an in-flight shutdown (event). 
Experience has shown that most contributing factors in MROs nowadays are due to 
management of the organisation, not mechanics themselves. Therefore, MEDA views the MRO 
as a complex system with the mechanics being only one part of it.  
 
Figure 2. MEDA contributing factors model [1] 
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Figure 2 shows organisational levels of MRO in general. Each level has various areas that, if 
weakened, might likely provide a space for contributing factors to occur. Figure 2 also indicates 
how upper organisational level might affect the lower one, from the organisation’s philosophy 
down to mechanics on the shop floor. 
 
1.2.2   MEDA Results form 
MEDA investigation is used to help MRO see the factors that might later contribute to an error 
and correct them (either reduce or eliminate) to create safer environment and prevent incidents. 
To do so, the so-called MEDA Results form was developed based on the previous findings. It 
is the main investigation tool when doing the MEDA investigation in MRO. 
The form (revision L) consists of several pages that cover the event history described in six 
sections. The sections are: 
1. General information 
2. Event 
3. Maintenance system failure 
4. Chronological summary of the event 
5. Summary of recommendations 
6. Contributing factors checklist 
These sections and their subsections can be modified by respective MRO to best fit their needs. 
The whole MEDA Results form is attached to this thesis as Appendix 1. 
 
1.2.3   Taxonomy 
For the purposes of this thesis, sections II., III. and VI. of MEDA Results form are essential as 
they contain specific maintenance taxonomy used for event, failure and factors classification. 
Sections III. and III. are shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4, respectively. Figure 5 shows a part 
of Section VI. 
 
1.2.3.1   Events 
Figure 3, MEDA events taxonomy, classifies eight basic types of maintenance events 
depending on the area they affect.  
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The events are: 
1. Operations process event 
2. Aircraft damage event 
3. Personal injury event 
4. Rework 
5. Airworthiness control 
6. Found during maintenance 
7. Found during flight 
8. Other event 
These event types are for general allocation of an occurrence, therefore an investigator may 
choose a more accurate classification within each event’s type, as seen below. 
 
Figure 3. MEDA events taxonomy [1] 
 
1.2.3.2   Maintenance system failures 
Terms used in Section III., maintenance system failures, represent error and violations that 
contributed to an event. This classification covers most of the failures that might occur during 
maintenance repair operation, therefore are applicable to any MRO worldwide.  
The maintenance system failures include: 
1. Installation failure 
2. Servicing failure 
3. Repair failure 
4. Fault isolation/test/inspection failure 
5. Foreign object damage/debris 
6. Airplane/equipment damage 
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7. Personal injury 
8. Maintenance control failure 
9. Other 
 
Figure 4. MEDA failures taxonomy [1] 
 
1.2.3.3   Contributing factors 
Lastly, there is a set of different factors that may contribute to failures above. These contributing 
factors are contained in Section VI. of MEDA Results form. Even though the factors’ selection 
is quite comprehensive, there can always be other factors not included in the Form that had 
something to do with an occurrence. In this case a blank field is provided for investigator to 
define the factors that are not included within the Results form. 
The categories of factors are: 
1. Information 
2. Ground support equipment/tools/safety equipment 
3. Aircraft design/configuration/parts/ equipment consumable 
4. Job/task 
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5. Knowledge/skills 
6. Individual factors 
7. Environment/facilities 
8. Organisational factors 
9. Leadership/supervision 
10. Communication 
11. Other contributing factors 
Each category is made up of more detailed selection of the factors. Figure 5 shows category 
Leadership/supervision and its subcategories. 
 
Figure 5. MEDA factors taxonomy 
 
1.2.4   Benefits versus drawbacks 
For the event-based investigation, MEDA provides a great tool with its comprehensive Results 
form. The investigation, if taken properly, is a process revealing mistakes that led to an event. 
By uncovering the contributing factors, with the help of mechanics or management, the 
organisation is able to better control them and to prevent adverse safety outcomes. 
On the other side, the MEDA investigation can only be used as a reactive tool, meaning it can 
be applied after the event occurred. Plus, the investigation itself (the report) is still mainly 
focused on the mechanics/inspectors themselves. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that 
the failures which are recognized on mechanic’s part can be due to management’s incorrect 
procedures, organisation’s policy, etc. MEDA helps uncover these links and improves the safety 
at all levels of MRO. 
As for the purposes of this thesis, the main benefit is the maintenance taxonomy developed by 
the MEDA team. It provides clearly defined event categories, system failures and quite detailed 
list of contributing factors. 
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1.3   ECCAIRS 
1.3.1   General philosophy 
ECCAIRS is a “co-operative network of European CAAs and safety investigation authorities. 
The project is being managed by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission on 
request of the Directorate General for Mobility and Transport and in close co-operation with 
EASA.” [5] 
The mission of ECCAIRS in general is “to assist national and European transport entities in 
collecting, sharing and analysing their safety information in order to improve public transport 
safety.” [4] As for the civil aviation, ECCAIRS aims to “improve air safety by bringing together 
the knowledge derived from the collection of incompatible occurrence reporting systems from 
various (member) States.” [3] 
Based on the above, the main objective of ECCAIRS was to develop a common aviation 
language using a rich classification for reportable data. A lot of work has been done since the 
launch of the original project in 1989. The ECCAIRS taxonomy is already widely implemented 
among some aviation service providers. The results have shown that having a common 
definitions and terms with clear meaning for occurrence data reporting is of high value for 
safety data collection, exchange and analysis, not only on a state level but regionally or 
internationally as well. 
 
1.3.2   Taxonomy 
The ECCAIRS taxonomy covers extensive area of civil aviation operations and is being 
regularly updated. Within ECCAIRS taxonomy, any term, word or phrase (attributes) is 
assigned with a specific identification number, which helps prevent any substitution. Also, a 
short description is provided for most of the attributes to help classify occurrences more 
accurately and consistently. 
The taxonomy development was mostly oriented on airlines, ATM suppliers and aerodromes. 
Below are some examples of occurrence categories being already used: 
• AMAN: Abrupt manoeuvre 
• ICE: Icing 
• SYST: System failure/malfunction or defect 
• LOC-G: Loss of control - ground 
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• RE: Runway excursion 
• ATM: ATM/CNS 
• F-NI: Fire/smoke (non-impact) 
• FUEL: Fuel related 
But in recent years, a lot of effort was and still is being put into creating a taxonomy better 
suitable for the area of maintenance. Even though a more general categorisation of occurrences 
similar to the one above is not officially established yet, a lot was done for events and factors 
classification. 
ECCAIRS uses three levels coding structure for occurrences as shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. ECCAIRS occurrence level coding [6] 
 
1.3.2.1   Events 
Events are usually based on findings from reports and analysis. One occurrence can be 
described with several events that happened consequentially. 
Several event types were identified among the existing ones in ECCAIRS taxonomy that are 
applicable to MRO. These are1: 
1. Consequential events 
2. Aircraft/system/component related event 
3. Events of an operational nature 
4. Personnel events 
5. Organisational events 
6. Any other events 
                                                 
1  Event categories listed contain many subcategories, some relevant to maintenance, some not. Putting down all subcategories 
would extend the scope of this thesis, therefore only several were chosen. 
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1.3.2.2   Contributing factors 
ECCAIRS utilizes two types of factors that contribute to events: 
1. Descriptive factors (technical) 
2. Explanatory factors (human) 
 
Descriptive factors 
Descriptive factors add detail to events, in other words, they provide extra information from 
technical point of view. 
Again, for maintenance purposes only some descriptive factors were extracted from ECCAIRS 
taxonomy. The main categories of descriptive factors applicable for maintenance are2: 
1. Operation and maintenance of the aircraft, its components and systems 
2. Undefined  
 
Explanatory factors 
Explanatory factors incorporate organisational and personal issues. They adopt SHELL 
(software/hardware/environment/liveware) model philosophy on how different interactions of 
and between these interfaces affect the event. 
ECCAIRS explanatory factors categories related to maintenance are2: 
1. Liveware 
2. Liveware (human) – environment interface 
3. Liveware (human) – hardware/software interface 
4. Liveware (human) – interface system support 
5. Liveware (human) – liveware (human) interface 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2  ECCAIRS contributing factors categories listed contain many subcategories, some relevant to maintenance, some not. 
Putting down all subcategories would extend the scope of this thesis, therefore only several were chosen. 
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Figure 7 below sums up occurrence classification using ECCAIRS methodology that stands on 
its logic. It is obvious that adopting this structural and detailed approach means adding quality 
to data collection and processing. 
 
Figure 7. ECCAIRS occurrence classification [6] 
 
1.3.3   Benefits versus drawbacks 
ECCAIRS is a great tool for data collection and processing, which was already confirmed by 
positive feedback from organisations that already implemented ECCAIRS and use it for 
occurrence reporting. Moreover, along with the system itself comes a comprehensive aviation 
taxonomy, which is being regularly updated and improved. ECCAIRS adapts to changes and 
industry needs, hence its taxonomy renewal is an ongoing process. This is important for the 
future of maintenance occurrence reporting. To have common, clearly defined and applicable 
collection of terms and definitions is essential for creating safer environment within MRO and 
prevent incidents or accidents. 
Still, a huge drawback of ECCAIRS taxonomy lies in its complexity. There is too much 
terminology defined, with some being related to maintenance, some not, that someone might 
find it confusing and hard to organise and suit for his/her organisation’s needs. Because, as for 
any aviation organisation, each MRO is specific and focuses on different aspect of aviation 
maintenance. The terminology chosen to report and classify safety data has to be clear and 
understandable to all involved, whether it is mechanics or management. 
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1.4   Summary 
Even though there are not many taxonomy sources designated for MROs, ECCAIRS and 
MEDA contain sufficient amount of attributes describing maintenance related events and 
contributing factors. Both MEDA and ECCAIRS work with similar terms definitions, whether 
speaking of events or factors description. ECCAIRS goes further and divides factors depending 
on whether the contribution is related to technical issues or human interaction issues. 
Combining and adjusting the two, a consistent foundation of aircraft maintenance taxonomy is 
ready for further application and implementation in any MRO (as a part of SMS reporting tools, 
MRO audits, inspection, etc.). 
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2   Analysis of data collection and processing procedures in safety management 
system of maintenance organisations 
 
2.1   Preface 
Safety data collection and processing system (SDCPS) refers to “processing and reporting 
systems, databases, schemes for exchange of information, and recorded information [7].” 
Methods for data collection and processing are similar in all areas of aviation operation and are 
usually at the heart of safety management system (SMS) of the organisation. The reporting 
quality (the amount of received data) via these systems varies from organisation to organisation, 
as it depends on many factors, especially related to reporting culture within the organisation. 
Reporting is mandatory for some types of occurrences affecting safety3, and voluntary for those 
that do not affect safety directly. Voluntarily reportable occurrences might have a potential to 
affect safety, and should be part of data collection and processing to analyse them and prevent 
potential safety outcomes. 
As for the MRO, the voluntary and confidential occurrence reporting has only started to be in 
the spotlight. This is mainly due to the fact that SMS for MRO is not yet regulatory, and as 
indicated previously, the SMS stands on the reporting. Because with low quantity of data 
(mandatory occurrences as the main source), its collection and processing is not sufficient for 
safety outcome prevention. Lately, the approach towards maintenance occurrence reporting has 
been positively changing. 
 
2.2   Safety management system 
Safety management system is a systematic approach for managing safety. SMS was developed 
particularly for organisations where the safety is of utmost priority, whether speaking about 
nuclear, chemical or aviation industry. Aviation safety needs to be managed proactively by all 
actors. Safety management benefits the total aviation system by strengthening traditional risk 
control practices and ensuring safety risks are managed in a systematic way. 
 
                                                 
3  More on mandatory reporting can be found in EU Regulation No 376/2014 
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2.2.1   SMS implementation requirements 
As per ICAO requirements, aviation service providers are responsible for establishing SMS, 
which is accepted and overseen by their State. Minimum SMS requirements for ICAO member 
states are defined in ICAO’s Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs). ICAO has also 
published guidance material on safety management principles and concepts to help providers 
with the implementation. These are contained in the ICAO’s Safety Management Manual 
(SMM) Doc 9859. 
As for the European Union and its member states, the first EASA SMS requirements were 
adopted in the form of authority (national CAAs) and organisation (service providers) 
requirements in the domain of air crew and in the domain of air operations (2006). 
Requirements are being progressively extended to other domains of the aviation system, and 
more are ahead. [9] Similar to ICAO, European service providers were given some extra SMS 
guidance material. EASA’s current SMS rulemaking status regarding service providers can be 
seen in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. EASA SMS requirements [10] 
 
When implementing SMS in any organisation, it is suggested to adopt an integrated approach. 
This means that SMS should not stand alone as an extra supplementary system, but rather be 
implemented into already existing management system as one of its parts.  
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2.2.2   SMS components 
SMS is comprised of four main pillars: 
1. Safety policy and objectives 
2. Safety risk management 
3. Safety assurance 
4. Safety promotion 
Each pillar then consists of several elements related to the scope of the pillar. To stay aligned 
with the topic of this thesis, no deeper description of all four SMS pillars will follow. Rather, a 
brief explanation of those that have something to do with data collection and processing will 
take place. These are safety risk management and safety assurance. 
SMS stands on well-developed safety risk management (SRM). To achieve that, it is essential 
to have a common and agreed-upon approach to risk. The organisation has to decide what is 
and what is not acceptable and how hazards have to be addressed. The key of SMS is to adopt 
principles of risk management into day-to-day operations.  
Safety risk management includes: 
• hazard identification processes (reactive, proactive, predictive) 
• risk assessment and mitigation processes (analysis, assessment and control of risks) 
• internal safety investigation following occurrences (either mandatory or voluntary) 
• safety performance monitoring and measurement (safety reporting, safety studies, safety 
reviews, safety audits, safety surveys) 
• management of change (changes with potential to adversely affect safety, assessing and 
managing existing risks) 
• continuous improvement (evaluations via audits, surveys, …) 
After SRM is developed and implemented, it is necessary to ensure that new processes are being 
practiced on a daily basis. This is called safety assurance (SA). SA’s function is basically to 
measure organisation’s performance by constantly evaluating SRM changes and deviations 
from standards (in terms of safety) that were established. Relations between SRM and SA 
processes can be seen in Figure 9 on the next page. 
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To monitor and review organisation’s performance in general, key performance indicators 
(KPIs) have to be defined. Likewise, indicators that reflect SMS performance are called safety 
performance indicators (SPIs). 
 
Figure 9. SRM and SA functions relation [12] 
 
2.2.3   Safety performance monitoring and measurement 
The core of SRM and SA is safety performance monitoring and measurement. There are two 
ways used for expressing safety performance that are compared to each other. 
• safety performance indicators 
• safety performance targets 
 
2.2.3.1   Safety performance indicators 
Safety performance indicators, or SPIs, are quantifiable measures representing each occurrence 
expressed in numerical terms. In other words, safety indicators are short and medium term 
objectives of an organisation’s SMS and are linked to its major components. SPIs need to be 
meaningful and provide direction for action. Also, SPIs have to be defined in a way that 
everyone in the company understands what they represent. 
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Examples: rejected take-offs due to maintenance failures, average number of MEL items 
per aircraft per fleet, flight delays/cancellations due to maintenance, average 
number of days late out of letter check, maintenance write-ups for 10 days after 
D check 
 
2.2.3.2   Safety performance targets 
Safety performance targets, or SPTs, are long-term objectives of an organisation’s SMS and are 
determined by weighing what is desirable and what is realistic for an organisation. Safety 
targets are, similarly to SPIs, expressed in numerical terms. By analysing SPIs and current level 
of safety performance and comparing it SPTs, one can determine if the organisation is doing 
fine or if more has to be done in order to achieve desired goals. 
Examples: By 2018 reduce the average number of maintenance write-ups per aircraft for 10 
days after D check to ≤ 5 
 
2.3   Safety management for maintenance organisations 
The maintenance domain is being considered for SMS adoption as well (see section 
Airworthiness in Figure 9) and some initiatives were already taken. EASA released Notice of 
Proposed Amendment (NPA) 2013-01 that proposes changes to the requirements for the 
embodiment of Safety Management Systems (SMS) in the quality system of Part M and Part 
145 approved organisations [11]. These requirements have not been amended yet, but many 
maintenance organisations have already started implementing some SMS components into their 
managements systems. 
For a long time, quality management system (QMS) was the way to interpret safety in MROs. 
Performing audits, inspections, analysing reports filled out by mechanics, it is all part of QMS. 
But compared to SMS, QMS is geared towards production rather than safety. To put it simply, 
QMS manages quality of processes and SMS manages safety risk in processes. It is important 
to realise that this difference exists. 
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2.4   Safety data collection and processing for maintenance organisations 
Safety data collection and processing is a system used to ensure the capture, storage and 
aggregation of data on accidents, incidents and hazards obtained from safety data sources. 
SDCPS is not necessarily computer based software (like ECCAIRS). In some MRO, several 
different maintenance reports and forms shall exist separately and MRO might not have any 
integrated software4 that would comprehend all these forms and process them. If this is the case, 
all reports containing safety data have to be manually linked together, looked for duplicates and 
assorted – for example in excel sheets or access databases. Then, the processing results can be 
visualised via graphs, charts, tables, etc. However, it is advised for organisations to move from 
this old disarranged way to a more sophisticated manner to collect and process safety data. 
 
2.4.1   Basic requirements 
Similar to any other efficient SDCPS, the one designated for MRO must comprise certain 
necessities: 
1. The system is specifically adapted to MRO operation 
2. The system is accessible to all relevant subjects (mechanics, supervisors, management) 
3. The information within the system (taxonomy) is clear and understandable to all relevant 
subjects 
4. The system collects safety data from various sources (reports, MEDA forms, email 
notices/complaints, audit findings, inspections, surveys, etc.). 
5. The system contains various means of reporting (mandatory/voluntary/confidential reports, 
electronic/paper reports, etc.) 
 
2.4.2   Safety data collection 
Safety data can be collected from many different sources. The key is to utilise as many as 
possible, because the more we know about occurrence the more we can do to prevent it from 
happening again. 
This subsection reviews basic types of safety data and how data are reported. 
 
                                                 
4  The reason most MRO do not have integrated SDCPS software implemented yet is that those available are quite costly. 
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2.4.2.1   Data types 
For the purpose of data reporting in aviation industry, there are three types of safety data - 
reactive, proactive and predictive. 
 
Reactive data 
These are events that already occurred, like incidents or accidents. These events could have had 
a direct impact on safety. Reactive data sources are incidents and accidents reports 
(mandatory/regulatory occurrences mostly), MEDA and REDA. 
 
Proactive data 
Proactive data are usually received from safety audits, surveys, check rides, and inspections. 
Voluntary reporting and internal hazard reporting from personnel (pilots, mechanics, ramp 
staff, cabin crew) also fall under this category. 
 
Predictive data 
These data reflect real-time system performance in daily operations to identify future problems 
with a potential to cause harm. Examples for maintenance include maintenance and ramp line 
operations safety assessments, digital flight data recorder analysis, etc. 
In general, safety data come from internal or external sources. Internal sources include 
voluntary or mandatory reporting systems, safety surveys, internal audits, feedback from 
training, investigations of accidents or incidents. External sources include industry accidents 
reports, state oversight audits, customer audits, SAFA inspections, information exchange 
systems.  
 
2.4.2.2   Reporting 
Reports, as stated above, are one way to move forward an information about occurrences or 
hazards. For states and their service providers in European Union, reporting falls under 
Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 
on the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation. Reports can be 
mandatory (regulatory) or voluntary.  
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Mandatory reporting 
Mandatory reporting requires personnel to report accidents and certain types of incidents by 
law. ICAO defines [13] mandatory reporting as reporting of certain types of events or hazards. 
This necessitates detailed regulations outlining who shall report and what shall be reported. 
Some mandatory reportable occurrences from maintenance are: 
• structural defects 
• system malfunctions 
• maintenance and repair problems 
• propulsion problems and auxiliary power unit problems 
 
Voluntary reporting 
Voluntary reports are vital for accident and incident prevention, and all employees should be 
encouraged to report any event or hazard with a potential to cause damage. Voluntarily 
reportable data could be: 
• excessive duty times 
• rushing through checks 
• poor communication between operational areas 
• lack of planning 
• inadequate tool or equipment control 
• expiration of chemicals 
• lack of up-to-date technical manuals 
Report forms should be simple, quickly fillable and user-friendly. This features are important 
since in MRO, most reports come from employees on the shop floor, who best can identify what 
potential hazards are from years of practice. And if the report takes too much time to fill in or 
contains unclear sentences or complex taxonomy, the amount of voluntary reports received will 
not be very high. 
Before the report is used it should be consulted with respective employees for any mishaps or 
uncertainties. Knowing what to report plays a key role in an active reporting program. Report 
submission procedures should be well documented and should include the information on 
where and to whom they should be submitted. 
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2.4.3   Safety data processing 
Any occurrence or event is an opportunity to learn new safety lessons. For employees and 
management to understand what and why went wrong, all events have to be precisely analysed 
for contributing factors. Occurrences and related events and factors have to be correctly 
classified to match selected SPIs that can be used for further safety performance measurements 
and predictions (see Figure 10). This whole philosophy stands on the well-developed 
taxonomy, as without the proper taxonomy the classification of events and factors would 
stumble. 
 
Figure 10. Relationship between safety data sources and SPIs [8] 
 
After the analysis, all findings should be exchanged between relevant parties and feedback 
should be provided to those that reported safety data. Once hazards are analysed for the risk 
they represent to their environment and overall operation, organisation should try to mitigate or 
eliminate the risk they represent. 
 
2.5   Summary 
Chapter 2 showed what a typical SDCPS for MRO should look like and what basic requirements 
it should have. These systems are usually very similar among all aviation service providers. 
Data processing is as important as its collection, because if the analysis of data lacks the quality 
or enough time it may not reflect what was or is really going on and where the attention should 
be directed. This way the risk from unrevealed hazards cumulates and, if still neglected, results 
in accidents or incidents. Therefore, it is necessary not only to promote safety and reporting 
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culture among employees, but to have personnel trained for working with lot of different safety 
data and identify any discrepancies. 
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3   Proposal for integrated safety data collection and their systematic 
classification 
 
3.1   Preface 
Chapter 3 is the practical part of this thesis and combines the facts from two previous chapters. 
Existing aircraft maintenance taxonomies (MEDA, ECCAIRS) discussed in chapter 1 are used 
as the main source to propose a new, adjusted taxonomy for aircraft maintenance data 
classification. However, it is important to point out that besides utilising these taxonomies, 
some new terms are added. This is because ECCAIRS and MEDA do not fully cover all 
maintenance related terms that would fit any type of data. Means of collecting safety data were 
analysed in chapter 2. Chapter 3 does not utilise all these data sources, as the data in MRO 
mostly comes from reports5. Therefore, only various types of reports are proposed. 
Based on the above, a redesigned safety data collection applicable to maintenance organisations 
is proposed. More specifically, section 3.2 proposes various types of reports to be used for data 
reporting. Section 3.3 then explains what it means to have an integrated safety data collection 
and how safety data should be stored. Lastly, section 3.4 underlines the importance of a 
systematic way to classify the data. 
 
3.2   Aircraft maintenance reports and their classification 
Data that go to safety database come from different sources, either electronically or on paper. 
The first step is therefore to divide the incoming data depending on its origin. Table 1 shows 
some basic report types used for data collection in MRO. 
Table 1. Basic types of reports in MRO 
Type of report Description 
Maintenance occurrence report   mandatory, voluntary reporting 
Audit report internal, external audits 
Personnel self-assessment report self-assessment related to workplace conditions 
Hazard report voluntary reporting of hazards 
Complaint voluntary reporting related to MRO operation 
                                                 
5  Other means of data collection (like safety surveys) are not used on a daily basis and are usually created for specific purposes. 
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The form and complexity of these reports varies. Following subsections describe each report 
type individually and pick out their main features. 
 
3.2.1   Maintenance occurrence report 
Maintenance occurrence report (MOR) should be one of the primary sources of data in any 
MRO. Used mostly by mechanics, the report provides information on what happened and why 
it happened during aircraft maintenance. It should be used when reporting mandatory 
occurrences like accidents, significant incidents or incidents, but it can also be used to report 
other occurrences related to maintenance (known as occurrences without safety effect). 
The fields to be filled in MOR should include: 
1. Headline 
2. Type of maintenance 
3. Phase of operation 
4. Occurrence class 
5. Occurrence category 
6. Events and contributing factors 
7. Effects on operation 
8. Narrative 
9. Comments 
 
1   Headline 
Headline should include some basic facts about the occurrence, like date and time, location of 
occurrence (hangar, on-stand, in-flight, apron), aircraft type, operator, component specification, 
P/N, S/N, ATA code, etc. Also, it should include the information on when the occurrence was 
noticed (during inspection, audit, airworthiness control, etc.) 
 
2   Type of maintenance 
MOR should have an option for a mechanic to select the type of maintenance that is related to 
an occurrence (see Table 2 on the next page). 
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As more reports are filled out and some statistics can be made, it is easier to directly see which 
type of maintenance is weaker and needs more attention. 
Table 2. MOR: Types of maintenance 
  
Type of maintenance Description 
Aircraft maintenance overhaul, inspection, replacement 
Application of SB/AD application of service bulletin or airworthiness directive 
Un-scheduled maintenance check hard landing, bird strike, turbulent air, lightning 
strike 
Aircraft modification aircraft modification by maintenance personnel 
Aircraft major repair as defined by ICAO, FAA or EASA 
Aircraft scheduled check aircraft scheduled check by maintenance personnel 
Aircraft minor repair as defined by ICAO, FAA or EASA 
Aircraft installation aircraft installation by factory personnel 
 
3   Phase of operation 
If known, reporting personnel should provide information on when the problem occurred. Table 
3 divides general operation into five phases. 
Table 3. MOR: Phases of operation 
Phase of operation Description 
In transit to/from stand occurrence during aircraft transit on apron 
Maintenance occurrence during base or line maintenance 
Parking occurrence during aircraft parking 
Towing occurrence during aircraft towing 
Flight occurrence during aircraft flight 
 
4   Occurrence class 
The very basic occurrence classification should include whether the occurrence was an 
accident, significant incident, incident or had no safety effect (see Table 4 on the next page). 
Reporting personnel should be trained to correctly assign occurrences. If unsure, an option -not 
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determined- should be provided. This information can be later clarified by safety manager or 
civil aviation authority. 
Table 4. MOR: Occurrence classes 
Occurrence class Description 
Accident as defined by ICAO 
Significant incident as defined by ICAO 
Incident as defined by ICAO 
Occurrence without safety effect occurrence had no safety outcome 
Not determined further guidance on occurrence classification required 
 
5   Occurrence category 
ECCAIRS divides occurrences into several occurrence categories. The problem with this 
framework is that it was developed to suit the needs of only some types of service providers 
(ATM, aerodromes, etc.), where occurrence reporting uniformity among and within states was 
of utmost importance, and therefore excluding aircraft maintenance providers. The idea is to 
create similar model applicable to MRO. Table 5 shows a proposal for occurrence 
categorisation in MRO. These categories should cover any occurrence that is likely to happen 
during aircraft maintenance. 
Table 5. MOR: Occurrence categories 
Occurrence category Description 
ACFT: Aircraft/aircraft 
component damage 
physical damage to body, engine, landing gear, 
propeller, flaps, etc. 
MAT: Aircraft material aircraft material (age, handling, marking) 
SYST: System 
failure/malfunction or defect 
aircraft systems failures (hydraulics, pneumatics, 
electronics) 
FAC: Facilities facilities damage as a result of maintenance 
PERS: Personnel injuries any injuries to maintenance personnel when 
performing their job 
FOD: Foreign object damage any occurrence caused by foreign objects 
F-NI: Fire/smoke (non-impact) fire or smoke as a result of maintenance 
OTHR: Other any other occurrences not mentioned above 
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Table 6 shows proposed types of occurrence categories in comparison to those from ECCAIRS. 
There are only two occurrence categories that were adopted from ECCAIRS – SYST and F-NI. 
Table 6. Comparison of existing vs. proposed taxonomy (occurrence categories) 
ECCAIRS occurrence categories Proposed occurrence categories 
AMAN: Abrupt manoeuvre ACFT: Aircraft/aircraft component damage 
ICE: Icing MAT: Aircraft material 
SYST: System failure/malfunction or defect SYST: System failure/malfunction or defect 
LOC-G: Loss of control - ground FAC: Facilities 
RE: Runway excursion PERS: Personnel injuries 
ATM: ATM/CNS FOD: Foreign object damage 
F-NI: Fire/smoke (non-impact) F-NI: Fire/smoke (non-impact) 
FUEL: Fuel related OTHR: Other 
 
6   Events and contributing factors 
These are events and factors that might contribute to an occurrence. Initial information received 
depends on knowledge or assumptions of personnel who reported the occurrence (which for 
MOR are mechanics or line supervisors). As investigation proceeds, events and factors can be 
added or adjusted based on the findings. 
Occurrence report should not be very long or hard to fill in. Personnel reporting an occurrence 
usually wants to fill in the report quickly, which means that the information received will often 
be very brief. Therefore, events and factors selection in MOR is top level selection. This means 
that there are few general categories of events and contributing factors and mechanic should be 
able to choose the right category. Later, safety manager or someone who works with safety 
database can add more specific events and factors by reading narrative of the report or after 
interviewing mechanics.  
 
Events 
Table 7 on the next page combines MEDA and ECCAIRS event related taxonomies and 
proposes their top level classification with some examples. 
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There are five event categories proposed: 
Table 7. MOR: Events 
Event category Description 
Maintenance technical events specific aircraft parts/components (damage, loss, …)  
Maintenance operational events fault isolation, FOD control, acceptance/storage of 
tools, maintenance inspections/controls/planning 
Personnel events experience, knowledge, performance 
Organisational events organisation’s documentation, publications, 
management events, non-compliance with regulations 
Other events any other event 
 
Contributing factors 
Table 8 suggests top level classification of contributing factors for MROs.  
Table 8. MOR: Contributing factors 
Contributing factors category Description 
Aircraft maintenance 
instructions/directives 
application of SB, AD, maintenance repair 
documentation 
Aircraft maintenance procedures insufficient, unfollowed, not supervised 
Aircraft/system/component all systems and components of aircraft 
Communication improper/lack of communication, misunderstanding 
Environment/facilities physical/psychosocial aspects of environment and 
facilities on performance 
Ground equipment and hardware 
support old/dirty/lack of equipment 
Maintenance tools and equipment tools/chemicals, their cleanliness, numbering 
Knowledge/skills/training personnel knowledge of tasks, procedures 
Leadership/supervision lack of leadership, pressure, no oversight 
Organisational factors organisation’s policies, decisions 
Physiological factors fatigue, illness/incapacitation 
Psychological factors learning, personality, memory issues 
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Again, both ECCAIRS and MEDA contain a solid inventory of factors terms. ECCAIRS 
divides factors into two categories, namely descriptive and explanatory factors. Descriptive 
factors represent technical issues, whilst explanatory factors focus on human interactions. This 
general selection is not necessary when determining what caused an occurrence, as usually both 
technical and human factors have their share in an occurrence and they do frequently overlap. 
General contributing factors proposed in Table 8 are therefore not divided into these two 
categories. 
Also, it can be noticed that an event category Personnel events in Table 7 (e.g. experience or 
knowledge) and factors category Knowledge/skills/training in Table 8 basically cover the same 
content. The fact is that many top ECCAIRS events and contributing factors are quite similar 
in their content6. And although taxonomy that was proposed for MOR is unique when speaking 
of selecetion of categories (some being from ECCAIRS, some from MEDA, some as a 
combination of the two), its logic (i.e. requirement to pick both an event and a contributing 
factor for an occurrence) is still rather based on ECCAIRS as it is the main reporting tool in 
aviation worldwide. 
 
7   Effects on operation 
The proposal for effects selection is shown below in Table 9. 
Table 9. MOR: Effects on operation 
Effect on operation Description 
Aircraft not ready for operation delay due to maintenance 
Fire services fire services assistance was required 
Security services security services assistance was required 
Flight delayed/cancelled flight was delayed or cancelled 
Maintenance action extra maintenance was required 
No effect on operation no consequential events 
 
                                                 
6   ECCAIRS events and contributing factors are already being grouped together. After the merger, there will be only one huge 
group of terms representing all kinds of possible contributing events/factors that can cause an occurrence. 
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Proposed effects on operation in Table 9 are basically consequential events. Some of these 
events might already be included in MOR as event categories (see Table 7). Though, basic 
selection of possible (common) effects should still be an extra part of MOR as the personnel 
reporting an occurrence can usually directly answer what were the consequences of an 
occurrence. For someone who later works with the report itself, this information is an instant 
feedback on what happened due to occurrence and how severe it was. 
 
8   Narrative 
Narrative is a brief description of an occurrence provided by someone who reported it, in his/her 
own words. This field can contain information on whether any corrective action was taken 
immediately and which events and factors probably contributed to the occurrence. This field is 
likely to include a more personal view of an occurrence and mechanic’s opinion on the probable 
cause. 
 
9   Comments 
At the end of MOR, a reporting personnel shall provide a positive comment related to the 
occurrence. Personnel can describe what was done correctly, what was done differently (and 
not necessarily wrong) compared to a standard procedure, what helped to prevent other events 
from occurring, etc. 
Personnel can also provide their own ideas on fixing the problem and preventing it from 
occurring again. 
 
3.2.2   Audit report 
Audit reports represent another source of data in aircraft maintenance. These reports are filled 
out by auditors who perform MRO audits. The areas that are usually audited depend on MRO’s 
scope of operation and can include maintenance planning, technical records, maintenance 
manuals, etc. Audit itself is performed with some checklist questions suited for each area that 
needs to be audited. Depending on audit results, an audit report should be filled out along with 
information on what corrective actions have to be taken to eliminate discrepancies. 
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Audits are performed internally by company’s auditors, or externally by CAAs or customer’s 
auditors. They reflect on company’s current performance and show its strengths and 
weaknesses. Therefore, it is essential to look at audit results properly as any space for 
improvement should be welcomed. 
Checklist questions will not be discussed in this chapter. The reason is that many different 
checklists can be used for aircraft maintenance audits. On the other side, an audit report 
(containing the actual results of an audit) can be uniform and applicable nearly to all MROs no 
matter what their operation involves (landing gears, aircraft body, engines, etc.) 
There is one more thing to clarify before looking at the form of audit report itself. Internal audit 
report is created and maintained by respective company. MRO cannot affect the way external 
audit reports look like, therefore the forms of such audit reports will not be discussed. What 
MRO can do is to adjust its own database where all data are stored, so that it can utilise the 
information coming from external sources and compare it to its own audit data. 
The fields to fill in aircraft maintenance internal audit report should include: 
1. Headline 
2. Audit scope 
3. Audit findings 
4. Corrective actions 
5. Conclusions 
 
1   Headline 
Headline should contain information like audit number, audit date, subject of the audit and 
auditor’s name. 
 
2   Audit scope 
Scope of audit is an area of MRO operation that is subject to audit (in relation to EASA Part-
145 approved organisations). 
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For each audit area in Table 10 below its respective Part-145 section is provided. 
Table 10. Audit report: maintenance audit areas [18] 
Audit scope Description 
Facilities 145.A.25 
Personnel 145.A.30 
Certifying staff 145.A.35 
Equipment, tools, material 145.A.40 
Acceptance of components 145.A.42 
Maintenance data 145.A.45 
Production planning 145.A.47 
Certification of maintenance 145.A.50 
Maintenance records 145.A.55 
Occurrence reporting 145.A.60 
Safety and quality policy, maintenance procedures and quality system 145.A.65 
Maintenance organisation exposition 145.A.70 
Privileges of the organisation 145.A.75 
Limitations on the organisation 145.A.80 
Changes to organisation 145.A.85 
 
3   Audit findings 
Auditor’s specification of discrepancies that were found during the audit. Each area of audit 
from above covers the whole process or procedure, and the auditor should provide an 
information on what specific component of that procedure was found insufficient. Auditor can 
also provide some information on what contributing factors were likely to be the reason for the 
discrepancies. 
 
4   Corrective actions 
Corrective actions that were already taken as an immediate response to the findings, and any 
corrective actions that will be taken in the near future. 
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5   Conclusions 
Auditor’s conclusions on audit findings, information on whether the audit report is finalised or 
left open for future modifications as investigation proceeds. Any other remarks related to the 
audit. 
 
3.2.3   Personnel self-assessment report 
Personnel self-assessment report is voluntary reporting on personnel’s work environment, 
actual conditions, health, training, etc. Personnel should be encouraged to check and report on 
these issues on a daily basis, even if no deficiencies are observed. Having this information and 
watching its trend is an instant feedback on how personnel’s performance changes and what is 
behind these changes, as degraded performance does not necessarily mean it is due to 
employees themselves. Lack of training, off-shift time, insufficient oversight, these are just 
some examples of how performance can be degraded due to other contributing factors than 
human error. 
 
3.2.4   Hazard report 
The process of hazard risk evaluation and risk management is a great way to prevent undesirable 
safety outcomes. But to start measuring the risk that hazards represent to safe operation they 
need to be identified and collected first. 
Hazard reporting should be voluntary and anonymous. There are many ways to report hazards, 
and hazard report is one of them. It is the main tool to report recognized hazards and should be 
available to anyone within a company. Besides, hazards can be reported orally or electronically 
(email, web/mobile application form), and are also sometimes revealed by audits and MORs 
(contributing factors). 
The purpose of hazard report is to directly point out hazards that exist in an organisation. Nature 
of these hazards can vary, some can be related to workplace conditions, some to inadequate 
procedures or lack of training. To help MRO keep track of hazards being reported and 
identified, a hazard register should be created. Here, all hazards can be gathered and risk can 
be managed. 
As concluded from the above, a general hazard report does not need to contain a lot of fields to 
fill in. For someone to report a hazard, he or she can directly name what might endanger a 
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normal, safe operation. After such report is acquired, respective manager will place the hazard 
under the category that it belongs to. As hazards are basically factors contributing to 
occurrences, factors categorisation in MOR (see Table 7) can be used for categorisation of 
hazards as well. Using the same taxonomy helps uncovering relations between separate 
occurrences and findings that are coming from different sources. 
Personnel reporting hazards should be also provided with space to explain what is the source 
of the hazard, how often it occurs and what are possible consequences. Responsible manager 
will then add the hazard into hazard register and start risk assessment process. After defining 
the risk, manager should suggest means to control it, and add this information back to hazard 
register. 
The risk that a hazard can represent is related to whether it is a hazard occurring regularly or 
rarely (likelihood of a hazard) and it also depends on how severe its consequences could be. 
Figure 11 on the next page shows hazard’s risk assessment matrix used by many high-risk 
industries, aviation included. 
 
Figure 11. Hazard’s risk assessment matrix [14] 
 
It is essential to provide feedback on hazards and associated risks to all personnel, via regular 
meetings or any other way. Personnel should be given extra knowledge on how to deal with 
risky hazards and what actions should be taken. As an example, there can be a certain job which 
procedure is hazardous and the risk associated with it is too high. If the job procedure itself is 
not that crucial and only the job result is, then the means of performing the job should change. 
If the job procedure has to be done a certain way that is risky, then other action should be taken 
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(job done by well-trained personnel only, less regularly, under supervision, etc.) to mitigate the 
risk when performing such procedure. 
 
3.2.5   Complaint 
Complaint is a form of voluntary reporting. An option for someone to submit a complaint should 
be available. Complaints have to be treated differently than occurrence or audit reports, and can 
be related to anything that has something to do with MRO’s operation. Some of them could be 
related to safety and therefore complaint is discussed here as another source of safety data. 
Complaints can come internally or externally, whether from mechanics, managers, cleaning 
staff or public. They should be anonymous and confidential. If the reporting person wants to be 
contacted back to know what actions were taken in response to his/her complaint, he or she can 
provide contact information. Complaint submission should be available via different methods: 
public email address designated specifically for complaints, a paper, or mobile application 
form. Sometimes, complaints can be passed on orally between personnel. 
 
3.3   Integrating safety data collection – a joint safety database 
3.3.1   Integrated: what it means and why adopt it? 
Making safety data collection integrated means that all incoming safety data are not to be 
perceived separately. Although they come from different sources and their flow varies a bit, all 
data come to one joint safety database where they should be processed the same way (see Figure 
12 on the next page). 
The reason to adopt an integrated safety data collection is to reveal existing connections 
between safety data coming from different sources. Same factors can contribute to occurrences 
initially reported via MOR or to those that were uncovered by audits, SAFA inspections, or 
MRO personnel. The next paragraph demonstrates this by giving a specific example. 
During Part-145 maintenance audit of Equipment, tools, material an unmarked material (few 
screws) was revealed. In the database, this has to be classified with a respective contributing 
factors (i.e. why the material was not marked). Later, safety manager might be processing MOR 
stating there was an occurrence that resulted in aircraft damage, therefore should be classified 
as ACFT: Aircraft/aircraft component damage. MOR can also contain information on what was 
the cause of occurrence. In this case, let’s assume that a mechanic used wrong screw to attach 
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the component to aircraft. It is later found out that the screw used by mechanic was unmarked. 
Despite realising this, the mechanic used this screw because it looked very similar to all the 
other screws and was placed in the same pack. Again, in the safety database, this occurrence 
should be classified accordingly with the same contributing factor as was the audit finding from 
above. Now, when a safety manager looks at the database, he can see that same contributing 
factor was revealed several times (unmarked material) and this should be an impulse for MRO 
to take actions, i.e. eliminate the presence of an unmarked material, provide recurrent training 
to mechanics. 
 
Figure 12. Integrated safety data collection 
 
3.3.2   Safety database 
There are different ways to store the data. Using excel sheets for storing all safety data is one 
way of doing the job. This could be an option for smaller-sized MROs with lower number of 
reported data. Other, more efficient way, is to have the database included in a software used for 
data processing. All bigger-sized MROs should go for this option, as with huge quantum of 
information to deal with one can easily overlook existing connections between occurrences, 
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hazards, etc. Analysis and processing of data would be a lot easier and faster this way. Instant 
feedback via graphs, statistics, accumulation of events and contributing factors, these are just 
some benefits of software safety database rather than using excel sheets with limited features 
for later data processing. More on adopting SDCPS as a software is discussed later in chapter 
4. 
Safety database itself is usually managed by a safety manager of company. If MRO does not 
have one, quality manager or any other appointed personnel should be trained to manage the 
database. It is not advised to have too many persons working with database as this could cause 
data duplication. 
Data input can be manual or automatic. If manual, one has to read all reports and fill in the 
information that is essential for analysis. If automatic, MRO needs to create electronic data 
reports by transferring information from paper forms into mobile applications or online forms. 
These would be then automatically transferred into software database ready for classification 
of extra attributes and later analysis. To adopt electronic report forms, the taxonomy in reports 
has to be identical with the one used in the software database. 
MRO hazard register should be part of safety database as well. Here, all hazards present in 
MRO operation are gathered through hazard reporting forms (electronic, paper) and assessed 
for risk. As mentioned before, some hazards get revealed by MOR or audit reports. When 
manager deals with such reports he or she can directly transfer revealed hazard to a hazard 
register, as all would be stored in one database. 
Besides collecting data from internal reports, an integrated safety database should also 
incorporate external data, like audit reports from CAAs, customers, SAFA inspections, etc. This 
means integrating the whole SDCPS not only internally, but with external subjects as well. 
Having all this information at one place provides a space to compare the results between all 
audits, no matter if discrepancies were observed from inside or outside the company. 
 
3.4   Systematic classification of safety data as part of data processing 
Systematic classification means that each occurrence in the safety database is assigned specific 
attributes. Some of these attributes are mentioned in the report form itself (like occurrence date, 
location, type of maintenance). However, reporting personnel does not know SDCPS taxonomy 
and cannot provide exact classification of attributes like occurrence category, events or 
contributing factors in the report. This is the task for safety manager. 
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But even safety managers from CAAs or from various service providers often struggle when 
trying to properly classify safety data by assigning correct events and factors to each occurrence 
[21]. As required by law, they must use attributes from ECCAIRS taxonomy for data 
classification. ECCAIRS contains a very detailed taxonomy with lots of events and contributing 
factors that can be just slightly different from each other. Besides similarities in content, events 
and contributing factors usually contain other set of factors. 
Figure 13 shows some groups of ECCAIRS contributing factors Experience, knowledge and 
recency.  
 
Figure 13. ECCAIRS contributing factors correlation [20] 
 
As seen, contributing factor Experience, knowledge and recency is a top level category factor 
(like the categories proposed in MOR Events and contributing factors in section 3.2.1). This 
factor contains few more categories of other factors, which then contain even more detailed 
contributing factors. Based on this, a safety manager is able to choose either more general (top) 
category of a contributing factor, or if enough data were provided (narrative of report states 
what exactly happened), a manager can choose a more in-depth factor. The problem is that 
sometimes, when managers deal with same types of occurrences to which same factors 
contributed, they might classify it with a more general category of contributing factor, like 
Inadequate or inaccurate knowledge, as they do not get more information from the report to be 
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more specific. On the contrary, let’s assume the same occurrence happens again. When the 
report is well filled in and one of the contributing factors is known to be Knowledge of 
procedures, then this is the one that is used for classification. Due to this, there is not enough 
accuracy in data classification and accumulation of specific factors might not reflect directly 
about on-going issues. This means that no matter how detailed the taxonomy is, if uniformity 
and accuracy are not maintained, the quality of data processing and analysis is low. 
The following is an example on the similarity in meaning or content coverage of events and 
contributing factors that safety managers have to face with ECCAIRS taxonomy. Contributing 
factor Knowledge of procedures in Table 13 can be used when ATM personnel contributed to 
occurrence by not knowing a specific procedure when guiding an aircraft. Using ECCAIRS 
taxonomy, a manager has an option to choose between too many event types and contributing 
factors that, in their content, overlap even between different top categories (in this group, 
another possibility for classification of contributing factor that someone would likely consider 
is General knowledge). 
Due to this complexity of ECCAIRS taxonomy, safety managers can be unsure if the 
classification they choose is the right one or detailed enough. What can happen is that a specific 
factor can regularly contribute to independent occurrences, but might be classified as a different 
factor when putting it into database. Analysis and measurements are then based on incorrect 
data and could misdirect management when making a bigger picture of what is going on. 
To solve this problem, ECCAIRS taxonomy should either be adjusted and contain less similar 
events or contributing factors, or safety managers should be provided training on how to work 
with such a complex database. Otherwise, ECCAIRS taxonomy will hardly ever be utilised for 
100% as personnel will often choose only the basic options for data classification in order not 
to misuse different factors. 
 
3.5   Summary 
Chapter 3 gave a proposal on how an integrated safety data collection should look like in a 
bigger-sized MRO by providing particular types of data report forms with specific taxonomy 
they should contain. Certainly, this is not the final look of such collection for all aircraft 
maintenance organisations. Each MRO may adjust their report forms to exactly match its 
operational needs. But chapter 3 of this thesis can serve as a good template. 
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Each report form proposed in this chapter contains a specific taxonomy. The idea was to create 
a taxonomy that derives from ECCAIRS (to the extent that ECCAIRS offers for aircraft 
maintenance purposes), because this can help MROs speak the same reporting language as all 
the other aviation service providers. And uniformity in data classification is essential. Also, it 
is very likely that in future, ECCAIRS taxonomy itself will be extended to cover all aviation 
maintenance areas. But, due to the coverage of ECCAIRS taxonomy valid now, MROs have to 
adopt their own taxonomy that can stand on ECCAIRS, but still needs to be enhanced and more 
detailed to fully cover all aircraft maintenance areas. Therefore, besides utilising ECCAIRS 
existing taxonomy in report forms in chapter 3, several terms (of which some are from MEDA 
Reports Form) were added. 
Final sections of chapter 3 emphasized that it is not just a relevant taxonomy that matters in 
SDCPS. To benefit from a well-developed taxonomy an accuracy during data classification 
process is necessary (ability to choose the right terms for all attributes). Besides classifying 
attributes correctly, it is more than necessary to mark all existing connections between 
occurrences/events/factors. As without one event/one factor the other would probably not 
occur. By marking their relations, it is easy to see what events usually lead to what 
consequences and prevent harm in future. 
Chapter 3 also analysed different ways to store safety data. For big maintenance organisations, 
the best way to store all data is in a safety database that is part of a data processing software. 
Lastly, safety managers should know how to work with the maintenance taxonomy used for 
data classification and they should be aware of its complexity. It is more than necessary to use 
correct and precise terms when classifying either the occurrence itself (assigning general 
category) or any contributing factor and still be as detailed as possible. Quality of safety 
information depends on it. 
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4   Proposal for implementation of integrated safety data collection and 
processing system into real-operation environment 
 
4.1   Preface 
Previous chapter proposed means to collect and systematically classify safety data in MROs. 
This chapter moves to the next step and proposes how SDCPS can be implemented into real-
operation environment. Moreover, the chapter discusses what needs to be overcome to achieve 
high quality of safety data processing and what it means to integrate the whole SDCPS within 
MRO. While chapter 3 was more focused on practical points, chapter 4 complements it by 
suggesting implementation principles that are based on theory and experiences from other high-
risk industries. 
SDCPS implementation relies on many different factors and is usually related to the phase of 
SMS implementation in which an organisation currently is. SMS for MROs alone is not yet a 
regulatory requirement, therefore any initiatives taken by maintenance organisations are 
voluntary and there is almost no support for them due to lack of experience with such dedicated 
systems from the industry. This affects the quality and effectiveness of MRO’s safety data 
collection and processing. 
Though, MRO’s should move forward regardless of EASA’s SMS regulation and try to improve 
their safety processes to enhance safety, protect their employees and increase reputation among 
its customers. One way to do so is to improve their safety data collection and processing and 
integrate it into their daily operation. 
 
4.2   Assigning responsibilities related to safety 
It is necessary to appoint a person responsible for managing SDCPS. If company does not have 
a safety manager, it shall delegate such responsibility to any other qualified personnel. This 
person has to be trained for working with huge amount of safety data, classify it, store it and 
analyse it. Also, such person should know his/her company and its operational scope well in 
order to see relations between reported data. 
Though, not all work related to safety improvements should lie on one’s shoulders. Ensuring 
high level of safety and its daily promotion should be responsibility of everyone, beginning 
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with MRO’s accountable manager and top management. Employees need to see that company 
puts safety first and fully supports all initiatives taken to improve it. 
When following SMS implementation steps and having enough resources, a company should 
also appoint a group of selected top management employees to form Safety Review Board 
(SRB). According to ICAO’s SMM, “SRB is a very high-level committee, chaired by 
accountable manager and composed of senior managers, including line managers responsible 
for functional areas. Safety manager participates in the SRB in an advisory capacity only.” [13] 
In other words, SRB’s main objective is to meet occasionally to discuss high-level issues in 
relation to policies, resource allocation and organisational performance monitoring. SRB meets 
infrequently, unless exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. 
Once SRB develops a strategic direction, implementation of strategies across the organisation 
must take place. This is the role of the Safety Action Group (SAG). “SAG is a high-level 
committee, composed of line managers and representatives of front-line personnel, and chaired 
in turn by appointed line managers.” [13] The group deals with implementation of ideas 
proposed by SRB and is managed by safety manager. 
Mainly, SAG [13]: 
• oversees operational safety performance within the functional areas and ensures that hazard 
identification and safety risk management are carried out as appropriate, with staff 
involvement as necessary to build up safety awareness 
• coordinates the resolution of mitigation strategies for the identified consequences of hazards 
and ensures that satisfactory arrangements exist for safety data capture and employee 
feedback 
• assesses the impact of operational changes on safety 
• coordinates the implementation of corrective action plans and convenes meetings or 
briefings as necessary to ensure that ample opportunities are available for all employees to 
participate fully in management of safety 
• ensures that corrective action is taken in a timely manner 
• reviews the effectiveness of previous safety recommendations 
• oversees safety promotion and ensures that appropriate safety, emergency and technical 
training of personnel is carried out that meets or exceeds minimum regulatory requirements 
Actions should be taken after SAG meeting. However, first meetings of SAG may not be very 
efficient. It is important to understand that people need time to cope with change and 
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comprehend it. Some things were done a certain way for many years and now personnel are 
required to meet regularly and discuss what never had to be discussed in such a complex 
manner. Once managers understand why the change is needed and what benefits it brings, it is 
much easier to convince all the other personnel to do the same. 
 
Figure 14. Safety accountabilities relations (airlines example) [15] 
 
Figure 14 gives an idea on how safety responsibilities are assigned in a bigger airline. For a 
maintenance organisation alone some units would be changed to fit its operational scope. 
 
4.3   Personnel training 
All employees should be trained regularly on issues regarding safety. Each group of employees, 
depending on the scope of their job, should have a training that is related to their part of the 
safety system. This means that mechanic does not need to know how to analyse safety data. He 
needs to be trained on how to identify and report the safety data to someone who will later 
analyse it. Therefore, MRO should make sure that an appropriate training will be provided to 
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all personnel, whether it is on SMS principles, reporting procedures (paper, electronic7), 
explanation of reporting forms and when to use them, hazard identification and reporting, etc. 
Also, instructors have to teach employees that safety training is not just about what one learns, 
but mostly why he or she learns it and how the training received can be later utilised in practice. 
Simply passing a final test is not the aim of such training. Maintenance staff should understand, 
like management has to, that safety must be perceived with the highest priority. 
Feedback from employees regarding training is necessary too, mostly when MRO is just starting 
integrating safety management system into their operation. Training has to be provided one step 
at a time, making sure each part of the training was understood well. If not, training should be 
adjusted and repeated. 
 
4.4   Enhancing positive safety culture: why and how? 
Reporting policy is developed, report forms are available to all employees, employees are 
trained to fill out the reports properly, and yet, the only safety data that enter the system come 
from mandatory reporting. Why? One reason might likely be an insufficient safety culture. 
One has to understand that integrating safety database and processing into daily operations is 
not a stand-alone process. It goes hand in hand with company’s safety culture. If one develops 
and implements means to collect safety data, it does not necessary mean the data will be 
collected. If safety culture is low and personnel do not see and understand why safety related 
data should be reported and exchanged, the reports themselves are useless. 
Therefore, following subsections review what safety culture is and what effective tools can be 
used to improve it. 
 
4.4.1   Safety culture principles 
A safety culture within an organisation is generally thought to be a set of beliefs, norms, 
attitudes or practices which reduce the exposure of all people in and around the organisation to 
conditions considered dangerous or hazardous. 
                                                 
7  If company decides to implement an electronic form of reporting, then all personnel should have access to electronic device 
in the working environment. 
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According to ICAO (1993), the characteristics of a ‘safe culture’, which should guide decision-
makers in modelling corporate safety culture, include the following [16]: 
• senior management places strong emphasis on safety as part of the strategy of controlling 
risks 
• decision makers and operational personnel hold a realistic view of the short- and long-term 
hazards involved in the organisation’s activities 
• those in senior positions do not use their influence to force their views on other levels of the 
organisation, or to avoid criticism 
• those in senior positions foster a climate in which there is a positive attitude towards 
criticism, comments and feedback from lower levels of the organisation 
• there is an awareness of the importance of communicating relevant safety data to all levels 
of the organisation (and with outside entities) 
• there is promotion of appropriate, realistic and workable rules relating to hazards, to safety 
and to potential sources of damage, with such rules being supported and endorsed 
throughout the organisation 
• personnel are well trained, and fully understand the consequences of unsafe acts. 
 
Safe organisations generally [16]: 
• pursue safety as an organisational objective and regard it as a major contributor to achieving 
production goals 
• have appropriate risk management structures, which allow for an appropriate balance 
between production and risk management 
• enjoy an open and healthy corporate safety culture 
• possess a structure which was designed with a suitable degree of complexity 
• have standardised procedures and centralized decision-making consistent with 
organisational objectives and surrounding environment 
• rely on internal responsibility, rather than regulatory compliance, to achieve safety 
objectives 
• put long-term measures in place to mitigate latent safety risks, as well as acting short term 
to mitigate active failures 
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Safety culture is composed of five components: flexible culture, learning culture, informed 
culture, just culture and reporting culture. Each component is explained below in Figure 15. 
The amount of safety data reported to management is closely related to company’s reporting 
culture and mostly, to its just culture. Therefore, when trying to get personnel to report and 
exchange more safety data, management and leaders should show their employees that their 
company acknowledges the principles of just culture and stands behind them. 
 
Figure 15. Safety culture key components [16] 
 
4.4.2   Safety culture improvement tools 
It is not easy to build an effective safety culture. As discussed before, personnel usually like 
doing things the ‘good old way’ and do not adapt to change on a day-to-day basis. Improving 
safety culture is a challenging process that requires a lot of time and mostly, a lot of effort from 
all participants. However, there are tools to help management and employees cope with such a 
big change. 
Besides providing appropriate safety training to personnel, management should ensure a regular 
stream of safety information to all employees. This is a good way to show personnel that it does 
not end with a training, that safety is not a one-time thing to discuss few times a year and then 
move on. 
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Disseminating safety information is often referred to as safety promotion. The ways to promote 
safety depend on size of MRO and some can be more relevant than others. 
Internally, safety can be promoted via safety bulletins, safety cartoons, safety notices, posters, 
CDs or DVDs, company’s newsletter, regular briefings or toolbox talks, recurrent trainings, 
emails, intranet information, etc. 
Externally, company can organise meetings, workshops or networking events, update their 
website to include safety information, provide online forums to talk about safety issues, etc. 
Figure 16 gives an example on how to increase awareness among personnel in hangar using a 
safety cartoon. “The Dirty Dozen” is a well-known set of twelve common human factors 
representing threat to aircraft maintenance personnel on a daily basis. 
 
Figure 16. “The Dirty Dozen” in aircraft maintenance [17] 
 
The twelve factors are: 
1. Fatigue 
2. Stress 
1. Complacency 
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2. Communication 
3. Awareness 
4. Distraction 
5. Lack of knowledge 
6. Teamwork 
7. Lack of resources 
8. Pressure 
9. Lack of assertiveness 
10. Norms 
 
Each factor of the twelve should be periodically shown on a visible place in hangar, making 
personnel more aware about their condition and surrounding environment. 
When personnel constantly come across safety information like this, it gets into their minds and 
integrates into their daily tasks. Putting safety first then becomes employee’s basic principle 
when performing his/her job. Surely, it takes time until such level of safety culture is achieved, 
but promoting safety is a good start. 
 
4.5   Integrating SDCPS 
Previous sections of chapter 4 proposed how to create an appropriate environment for SDCPS 
implementation. But there is one more important step to take in order to achieve an efficient 
implementation – SDCPS integration. 
SDCPS as a whole, similarly to safety data collection, should not be considered a separate 
system. Rather, it should be inherent to most MRO systems, because it interacts with all 
employees and processes. After all, safety is everyone’s responsibility. The best way to start 
integrating SDCPS within the whole MRO operation is to clearly define the roles and 
responsibilities of all entities interacting with SDCPS – what, why and how they are required 
to do. 
Employees of all MRO departments should have access to internal reporting forms, e.g. 
personnel from marketing or finances should be at least allowed to access a hazard report form, 
self-assessment report form and to submit a complaint. Also, a general email regarding safety 
issues should exist and be available to all personnel from all departments. To this email address, 
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personnel can send any safety related information, and any hazards, complaints, or maintenance 
occurrences as well. Although staff should be advised to use appropriate reporting forms, 
sometimes they might lack enough time to fill in the whole report. And the objective is to get 
as much existing safety data as possible, regardless the way they are reported. Besides internally 
connecting all relevant organisational units to reporting forms, some form of access has to be 
permitted to external subjects as well. For example, an option to report via public MRO website 
containing reporting form for public or again, a general email designated for safety purposes 
only. In Figure 17, all this is incorporated in Occurrence reporting rectangle. 
The above part of an integrated SDCPS was already illustrated in Figure 12 of chapter 3 and 
focuses mostly on safety data input from different internal and external sources into joint safety 
database. But integrating SDCPS also covers safety data output (see Figure 17). 
 
Figure 17. Integrated SDCPS 
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Not only MRO can utilise the safety information processed by its SDCPS, but national 
authorities as well. MRO’s SDCPS should therefore be linked to national safety database to 
pass relevant safety information onward, either in its own SDCPS taxonomy or ECCAIRS 
taxonomy. National authorities collect safety information similarly from all aviation service 
providers and maintain the national aviation safety database. They use this information to assess 
aviation safety on a national level. Besides, in their own database, they might be able to find 
connections between occurrences received independently from MROs, aerodromes, airlines, 
etc. 
Figure 17 also illustrates that national aviation safety database is linked to central ECCAIRS 
database that collects data from national aviation authorities of all EASA members. 
 
4.6   How to process safety data 
4.6.1   Quantity versus quality 
Assigning safety responsibilities, establishing and implementing principles regarding safety 
culture, reporting and collecting safety data, providing appropriate training to personnel and 
constantly working on enhancing the safety culture, it does not end here. Now, when the data 
are reported and enter MRO’s safety database, measurements and analysis take over.  
Safety manager’s main responsibility at this point is to go through all the reported data, analyse 
them and make conclusions. Even though this might look like an easier part of the whole 
implementation process, data processing requires a reliable person able to see and understand 
why there was an occurrence and what could have been done to prevent it. 
The processing starts after data were received. If reported occurrence does not provide enough 
data, safety manager should personally interview personnel that reported it to get more 
information. When reporting works well, a quantum of safety data come in. It is essential not 
to lose the track of what was reported and secure quality data output. One way to do this is to 
use correct terms for data classification. But with the current maintenance taxonomy used for 
data classification it is often hard to classify each occurrence and its contributing factors 
correctly (3.4). Therefore, MROs should adopt such taxonomy that is complex enough to cover 
all possible safety events but still easy to use. This means that boundaries between definitions 
of contributing factors are exactly defined so that safety managers will not be confused when 
classifying data. 
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But data processing, it is no just about taxonomy or correct classification. Data processing is a 
complex process that, in the end, has to provide clear feedback on safety matters. Other essential 
parts of data processing cover: 
• processing data that come from sources outside MRO’s SDCPS (e.g. OFDM) 
• classification, assessment and control of risks that hazards might present 
• increasing data relevance and data completeness 
• creating timeline of events or contributing factors (to see the time sequence of 
contributing factors and events) 
• regular safety issues (same, regularly repeated occurrences) and analysis of methods to 
reduce them 
The above parts of data processing are important and MRO should focus on their 
implementation within SDCPS as well. But since MROs are a little behind in SDCPS 
development compared to some other aviation service providers, a good start is to firstly 
develop an integrated safety data collection, along with a good taxonomy and data processing 
basics. 
 
4.6.2   SDCPS as a software program 
There are ways to improve quality of data processing. One of them, and probably the most 
efficient one, is to transfer from manual data processing to software data processing. In other 
words, digitalising SDCPS. 
This program, if developed well, can be of great assistance especially for safety managers and 
other personnel appointed to work with safety data. A well-developed SDCPS software is built 
on all SDCPS principles, i.e. it: 
• adopts an integrated (joint) safety database with ability to import and work with both 
internal and external data 
• uses a unique taxonomy that SDCPS stands on – for automatic transfer of data (submitted 
report form directly displayed in the software database) 
• provides user-friendly interface (e.g. easy orientation, quick occurrence search) 
• offers automatic search for existing connections between occurrences based on previous 
classification 
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• analyses and graphically illustrate safety trends in different maintenance areas based on data 
analysis 
• guides managers processing data to precise classification (e.g. when a contributing factor is 
related to use of maintenance procedures, manager should be able to easily look up all 
existing factors related to maintenance procedures, read their description if provided, and 
then decided and choose the right one) 
• gives top management the most current picture (an instant overview) of safety in MRO 
• shows current safety performance, e.g. using some safety indicators chosen by MRO 
management to assess the safety performance 
Digitalised SDCPS can be of great aid to data processing. It can help managers see what they 
would not be able to see on paper or in excel sheets. Accumulation of certain hazards and factors 
can be captured in time and harm can be prevented. And by preventing harm, whether speaking 
about physical damage to aircraft parts/components or personnel injuries, an organisation does 
save money. 
 
4.7   Summary 
Developing and implementing integrated SDCPS are two very different processes. Although a 
good data collection and processing system takes time to develop, organisations usually have 
access to guides and templates related to development of such system, as introduced in this 
thesis. Making it work in practice is a bit different. 
The speed of implementation process may differ between MROs and depends on various 
factors. Usually, MRO’s safety culture is the factor that impacts the implementation process 
most. Ideal safety culture supports staff and systems, recognises that errors will be made and 
believes blaming staff will not solve problems, but more likely decrease the number of reported 
data. A positive and supportive safety culture encourages open and honest reporting, seeks to 
learn from its failures and is open and fair in dealing with those involved. 
Several tools exist that can help MRO improve its safety culture. Each MRO should consider 
which tools are the most suitable for their operation and will positively affect the safety culture. 
Then, these tools should be progressively integrated into daily operations. If employees are 
exposed to many new procedures to comply with at once, these tools might have the exact 
opposite effect and even worsen the safety culture. Therefore, a step by step approach to 
implementation is essential. 
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SDCPS is not to be understood as a separate system. Integrating it into MRO operation is an 
essential step of successful SDCPS implementation. Its principles, mostly those related to data 
reporting, should be natural to all departments, whether it is a safety department, quality 
department, base/line maintenance, or even administration and finances (for hazard 
identification/reporting). 
Safety data processing is an inseparable part of any SDCPS. The way that data processing is 
done has a major impact on data output and its quality. MRO management has to understand 
that the quality of data is even more important than its quantity. In other words, high data 
quantity with poor quality will not improve MROs safety and will not save money. 
Safety data processing often lacks adequate resources, e.g. enough data sources, relevant 
taxonomy or trained personnel. To improve quality of safety data processing, chapter 4 
proposed that MROs start using a software program based on SDCPS principles. If maintained 
well, such program can be of great aid to those that process safety data. 
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5   Contribution evaluation of the proposed solution 
 
5.1   Preface 
Chapter 5, the last chapter of this thesis, evaluates how this thesis contributed to development 
and implementation of SDCPS applicable to aircraft maintenance organisations. 
The whole evaluation is divided into three segments to clearly demonstrate to which areas of 
SDCPS for MROs this thesis contributed and in what extent. These segments include SDCPS 
maintenance taxonomy, safety data collection and safety data processing. 
 
5.2   Contribution to aircraft maintenance taxonomy 
Taxonomy, as underlined many times throughout this thesis, is the cornerstone of any SDCPS. 
Common, uniform terms are essential for data measurements, analysis and safety data exchange 
between different parties. Therefore, terms used for classification of occurrences and all their 
attributes have to be precisely chosen to cover any potential event or contributing factor.  
ECCAIRS taxonomy that is related to aircraft maintenance operation, as detailed as it is, is 
currently not sufficient enough as it does not cover the whole MRO operation. On the contrary, 
MEDA taxonomy, although developed directly for MROs, is not detailed enough when 
speaking about some specific events or contributing factors. Still, when combining ECCAIRS 
and MEDA taxonomies, they offer a solid foundation of maintenance related terms. The new, 
proposed taxonomy for MRO’s SDCPS therefore utilises some of ECCAIRS and MEDA terms, 
and adds some extra in the areas they do not fully cover.  
This thesis contributed to aircraft maintenance taxonomy applied within the whole SDCPS, as 
terms proposed in reporting forms are later used for data processing as well. 
As for safety data collection, this thesis enhanced the taxonomy related directly to reporting 
maintenance occurrences, and was hence applied in MOR. The reason for this is that 
maintenance occurrence reporting in most MROs nowadays lacks support and sufficient 
promotion, and safety data are mostly gathered from only one or two sources (e.g. revealed by 
audits or reported via email). Another reason is that, for example, taxonomy used in audit report 
is similar to the one used in MOR (mostly in events and contributing factors categories by which 
audit findings should be classified). 
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For some sections of MOR, several completely new terms were proposed. This is the case of 
occurrence categories. ECCAIRS has a special taxonomy used to divide occurrences on a very 
general level. This category assignment is based on the area that occurrence is related to. If an 
occurrence is related to air traffic services, then its respective general classification would be, 
according to ECCAIRS, ATM: ATM/CNS. There are quite a few general occurrence categories 
that ECCAIRS currently uses, but only two of them are applicable to MRO operation: system 
failure/malfunction or defect and fire/smoke (non-impact). Following the logic of ECCAIRS 
for this general occurrence categorisation, several categories were added to match the 
operational scope of MROs.  
As for processing safety data, this thesis proposed that taxonomy used in report forms should 
be same (especially for electronic reporting) or at least similar to the one applied later in data 
processing. This way, classification of occurrences during data processing is less demanding 
and requires less time. Data processing itself then uses taxonomy that is a lot more complex 
than the one in reporting forms. It does not offer just a very basic selection (i.e. top level 
categories in MOR events and contributing factors), but a very detailed terms that each top 
category contains and that safety managers work with. Listing all these detailed events and 
contributing factors would extend the scope of this thesis, therefore only the top level selection 
was proposed. 
The proposed taxonomy tried to follow ECCAIRS basic logic of systematic data classification 
by adopting a similar concept for general occurrence categories (see Table 6) and by utilising 
those ECCAIRS terms that fit aircraft maintenance operation (mostly events and contributing 
factors). This is because ECCAIRS (with its specific taxonomy) is still the main occurrence 
reporting tool used nowadays among all aviation subjects. 
 
5.3   Contribution to safety data collection in MROs 
There are several ways to collect data in MRO. These were discussed mostly in chapter 2 of 
this thesis. Receiving information from more sources is important, as it helps uncover problems 
that would not be very likely uncovered by one information source only. The current situation 
of data collection in MROs needs to get more attention. When speaking about MRO voluntary 
data reporting, it is just at its roots. The objective is to achieve high quantity of data input, from 
both mandatory and voluntary reporting. The fact is that managers often struggle with getting 
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enough data from different sources – they mostly receive only data they find themselves (e.g. 
during audits). Therefore, MROs should direct some of its resources to improve this situation. 
This thesis picked out reports and their forms as the main tool to be used for safety data 
reporting. The reason is simple – besides practicing a word-of-mouth, reports are a classic way 
of passing information forward. Personnel should know them and understand them. As MROs 
are only being considered for SMS and its implementation, there is no need to rush and establish 
all elements that SMS stands on, like for example, utilising several means to report safety data 
with reports being just one of them. At the beginning of SDCPS development or enhancement, 
personnel might be facing too many new procedures to comply with. Having just a few report 
forms that are simple and easy to fill out is a good start to improve internal company reporting. 
Taking a step-by-step approach will ensure full implementation and adoption of new principles.  
Due to reasons mentioned above, proposal in chapter 3 focused mostly on different forms of 
reports applicable to maintenance organisations. These are namely maintenance occurrence 
report, or MOR, audit report, self-assessment report, hazard report and complaint. Each of these 
report types contains several sections that have to be filled in by reporting personnel. It is 
necessary that personnel understand the meaning of all terms used in respective report form. 
MRO’s safety data collection (the reporting forms) does not necessarily have to be electronic. 
Whether data come on paper report form or through electronic report form, or via general safety 
email, the fact is that it comes. MRO shall decide which way is going to be more user-friendly 
for staff. MRO can adopt paper reporting only, electronic reporting only, or a mixture of both. 
This means that paper forms are digitalised and personnel can fill them in using a mobile 
application or MROs website. Electronic report must use the same taxonomy as the paper one. 
Chapter 3 also underlined the importance of making safety data collection integrated. Only 
integration of all data (internal and external) in one joint safety database can reveal existing 
connections between occurrences reported from different sources. Otherwise, these connections 
could easily be overlooked and could make safety space more vulnerable. 
 
5.4   Contribution to safety data processing in MROs 
Safety data processing is the process that follows after data are gathered. This process can be 
done by specially appointed personnel or by safety or quality manager. Data processing covers 
many processes that are linked together, like data classification, quality check, increasing data 
relevance and completeness, assessment and control of risks, or assessment and control of 
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typical safety issues. Not all these processes were discussed in this thesis. The reason is that 
MROs are not that further ahead to be developing and implementing a fully advanced data 
processing within their SDCPS. Instead, they should firstly focus on the very basics of data 
processing – such as using a good taxonomy and precise data classification that clearly defines 
data. In order to do this well, this thesis proposed to adopt a software designed for data 
processing. Integrated safety database should be an inseparable part of such software. A 
software that helps managers process safety data offers many benefits. It keeps track of what is 
going on presently. Not only it helps improving safety processes, it also helps MROs stand out 
on the market. New aircraft types are built using the latest and most sophisticated technology 
that works with huge amount of data. Operating a modern fleet requires modern approach to 
repairing and maintaining these fleets. Air transport operators are very well aware of this fact 
and prefer those MROs that are able to adapt to this change. It is very likely that big data and 
the way MROs deal with them will determine the future of their business. According to The 
Lufthansa Technik Group Magazine [19], “the challenge is to have the ability to collect the 
data, to evaluate them and to react accordingly. This capability will characterize the successful 
MRO provider of the future.” 
 
5.5   Summary 
Chapter 5 evaluated the contribution of an SDCPS for MROs that was proposed in this thesis. 
The evaluation was brought down to three segments. When looking at a contribution of each 
segment individually, one does not might see the scale of its value. The fact is that an enhanced 
maintenance taxonomy and integrated safety data collection alone do not help MROs decrease 
occurrences or grow their business. Neither does adopting a data processing software without 
good data collection procedures or appropriate taxonomy. But when perceiving the contribution 
to all these segments altogether as the contribution to one integrated SDCPS for MROs, the 
contribution value is indisputable. 
SDCPS is all about integration and it has to be perceived this way from the very beginning. 
This thesis proposed that all MRO departments should have access to reporting forms, whether 
it is a mechanics or personnel from finances. Anyone should be able to report safety 
information. Moreover, processing data and getting valuable safety information is not useful 
just for MROs. SDCPS integration means passing safety information to external subjects, like 
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national authorities. They might use it to make their own analysis and propose different 
corrective actions. 
To sum up, all parts of SDCPS are important and linked together. Data collection (quantity of 
data) and data processing (quality of data) go hand in hand, and they both stand on a well-
developed taxonomy. The following explains it best: the better the reporting and collection 
procedures, the more data get in. The better the processing procedures, the more valuable safety 
information is obtained. Maintaining high data quality with high data quantity can be 
challenging. But for businesses like MROs, it is exactly what needs to be achieved. 
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Conclusion 
 
The aim of this thesis was to propose a concept of an integrated safety data collection and 
processing system applicable to aircraft maintenance organisations. Before peeking into the 
proposal itself, current means for data collection and processing were reviewed. An efficient 
SDCPS is built up using a taxonomy that is related to the operational scope of an organisation. 
For aviation areas other than maintenance, like aerodromes, air navigation services or air 
transport operation generally, a solid taxonomy is already developed and is being used among 
these providers. For aircraft maintenance providers, the development of such taxonomy is still 
in the process. 
Chapter 1 looked at existing taxonomies related to aircraft maintenance. Namely, the chapter 
went through taxonomies developed for MEDA and ECCAIRS. For the purposes of data 
classification, MEDA Results form used during MEDA investigation process represents a great 
source of terms related to aircraft maintenance. Another taxonomy reviewed in chapter 1 comes 
from ECCAIRS. The problem with ECCAIRS taxonomy is, paradoxically, that it was created 
as a response to regulations asking national authorities and certain service providers to report 
and exchange safety data. As a result, taxonomy development followed mostly needs of CAAs 
and those service providers required to report by law. This strongly affected the taxonomy 
development in areas like aircraft maintenance. Despite, ECCAIRS does contain a lot of 
valuable terms of which some can be utilised in SDCPS of an MRO. 
In chapter 2, a general SDCPS was analysed. SDCPS of various providers have a lot in common 
and the taxonomy they stand on is usually the only significant difference among them. Besides 
analysing specific ways to collect and process safety data, chapter 2 discussed current state of 
SMS regulation regarding MROs. As MROs are not yet required to implement SMS into their 
operation, data reporting lacks the support and oversight from a regulatory body, but mostly it 
lacks the support of external sources. There is no documentation or publications related to SMS 
implementation in approved maintenance organisations that would directly guide MRO’s top 
management on how to integrate such a complex system into their daily operation. Sources like 
ICAO’s SMM (Doc 9859) offer general guidance on how to develop safety policies, assign 
responsibilities, perform risk management, assure safety and promote it. But, as explained 
before, to perform risk management and assure safety is maintained, safety data need to be 
reported regularly and classified uniformly. In this direction, MROs are yet on their own.  
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In chapter 3, based on the previous know-how, a particular safety data collection applicable to 
MROs was proposed. The proposed collection focuses mostly on reports as the main source of 
safety data in MROs. Reports were divided into several types that are likely to be used in aircraft 
maintenance. MOR, audit report, personnel self-assessment report, hazard report and complaint 
are the reports proposed for collecting safety data in MROs. Each of these reports has specific 
features and uses specific taxonomy related to the scope of the report. MOR, for example, is 
used for occurrences related directly to aircraft maintenance. The common feature of all these 
reports is that a uniform taxonomy for data classification should be used, especially when 
talking about factors contributing to occurrences. Same factors can be revealed by MOR, audit 
report or hazard report. In order to see which of them cumulate and could cause harm in the 
near future, all these contributing factors have to be classified using the same taxonomy. 
Moreover, MRO should make safety data collection integrated to be able to collect and store 
safety data from different internal and external sources in one joint safety database. 
Chapter 4 proposed how SDCPS as a whole can be implemented into real-operation 
environment. There are various factors that could affect how well SDCPS will be welcomed. 
Firstly, to increase the quantity of reported data, a good safety culture has to be developed 
within the whole organisation. Chapter 4 therefore discussed ways how to increase the overall 
safety culture in MRO. But safety culture is not the only factor that makes SDCPS functioning. 
Safety culture can increase the quantity of data received, but it does not affect the way data will 
be processed. Data processing is an inherent part of any SDCPS and it is that part of the system 
that should show the results and make management act on them. Thus the main task of data 
processing is to transform reported data into a valuable safety information that shows 
management a full picture of safety performance in their organisation. Several ideas were 
proposed to achieve high data quality, speaking mostly about well-developed taxonomy, precise 
data classification and a software for data processing. Because it is not just the quantity of safety 
data received from employees that matters. Eventually, it is the quality of data processing that 
decides how much money organisation saves. 
In chapter 5, the last chapter of this thesis, a contribution of the proposed SDCPS was evaluated. 
This proposal is by no means the final look of SDCPS. MROs differ from each other, whether 
speaking of their size or types of maintenance they perform. The idea was to create a general 
template to help MROs develop or enhance their own SDCPS, focusing mostly on common 
taxonomy. 
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This thesis contributed to the field of aircraft maintenance taxonomy development and provided 
a template of SDCPS for aircraft maintenance. There are many other initiatives to improve 
safety in MROs. A big move forward will come when SMS becomes regulatory for approved 
maintenance organisations. This will not only enhance data reporting, collecting and processing 
procedures, but it will make MROs environment and operation a lot safer. Few years will pass 
until SMS regulations will be extended and valid, but MROs can and should work on improving 
their operational safety without a law. The fact is that a proper safety management is not about 
compliance, it is mostly about protecting employees, creating trust among customers, and 
making business grow by ensuring safety is always put first. And these beliefs should not be 
enforced, they should be natural to any organisation.  
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MEDA Results Form Revision L 19 September 2013 
Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA) Results Form 
Section I General Information 
Reference #:  ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ _________________________________  
Airline: ___________________________________________
Station of Maintenance System Failure: __________________ Date of Investigation:  __ __ / __ __ / __ __ 
Aircraft Type: ______________________________________ Date of Event:  __ __ / __ __ / __ __ 
Engine Type: ______________________________________ Time of Event:  _ _: _ _   am   pm 
Reg. #:  ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___  Shift of Failure:  _____________________________________  
Fleet Number:  ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Type of Maintenance (Mx) (circle one):  
ATA #:  ___ ___ ___ ___ 1. Line -- If Line, what type?   _____________________
Aircraft Zone: ______________________________________ 2. Base --If Base, what type?   ____________________
Ref. # of previous related event:  ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ Date Changes Implemented:    __ __ / __ __ / __ __ 
Section II Event 
Please select the event (check all that apply) 
1. Operations Process Event (  ) 3. Personal Injury Event 
(  ) a. Flight Delay _ days_ _ hrs._ _ min. (  ) f. Diversion (  ) 4. Rework (e.g., did not pass Ops check/inspection)
(  ) b. Flight Cancellation (  ) g. Smoke/fumes/odor event (  ) 5. Airworthiness Control
(  ) c. Gate Return (  ) h. Other (explain below) (  ) 6. Found during Maintenance
(  ) d. In-Flight Shut Down (  ) 7. Found during Flight
(  ) e. Air Turn-Back (  ) 2. Aircraft Damage Event (  ) 8. Other Event (explain below) 
Describe the incident/degradation/failure (e.g., could not pressurize) that caused the event. 
Section III Maintenance System Failure 
Please select the maintenance system failure(s) that caused the event: 
1. Installation Failure (  ) b. Unapproved 7. Personal Injury
(  ) a. Equipment/part not installed (  ) c. Incomplete (  ) a. Slip/trip/fall
(  ) b. Wrong equipment/part installed (  ) d. Other (explain below) (  ) b. Caught in/on/between
(  ) c. Wrong orientation (  ) c. Struck by/against
(  ) d. Improper location 4. Fault Isolation/Test/Inspection failure (  ) d. Hazard contacted (e.g., electricity, hot
(  ) e. Incomplete installation (  ) a. Did not detect fault or cold surfaces, and sharp surfaces) 
(  ) f. Extra parts installed (  ) b. Not found by fault isolation (  ) e. Hazardous substance exposure (e.g., 
(  ) g. Access not closed (  ) c. Not found by operational/ toxic or noxious substances) 
(  ) h. System/equipment not functional test (  ) f. Hazardous thermal environment 
reactivated/deactivated (  ) d. Not found by task inspection exposure (heat, cold, or humidity) 
(  ) i. Damaged on remove/replace (  ) e. Access not closed (  ) g. Other (explain below) 
(  ) j. Cross connection (  ) f. System/equipment not 
(  ) k. Mis-rigging (controls, doors, etc.) deactivated/reactivated 8. Maintenance Control Failure
(  ) l. Consumable not used (  ) g. Not found by part inspection (  ) a. Scheduled task omitted/late/incorrect
(  ) m. Wrong consumable used (  ) h. Not found by visual inspection (  ) b. MEL interpretation/application/removal
(  ) n. Unserviceable part installed (  ) i. Technical log oversight  (  ) c. CDL interpretation/application/removal
(  ) o. Other (explain below) (  ) j. Other (explain below) (  ) d. Incorrectly deferred/controlled defect
(  ) e. Airworthiness data interpretation
2. Servicing Failure 5. Foreign Object Damage/Debris (  ) f. Technical log oversight 
(  ) a. Not enough fluid (  ) a. Tooling/equipment left in aircraft/engine (  ) g. Airworthiness Directive overrun 
(  ) b. Too much fluid (  ) b. Debris on ramp (  ) h. Modification control 
(  ) c. Wrong fluid type (  ) c. Debris falling into open systems (  ) i. Configuration control 
(  ) d. Required servicing not performed (  ) d. Other (explain below) (  ) j. Records control 
(  ) e. Access not closed (  ) k. Component robbery control 
(  ) f. System/equipment not 6. Airplane/Equipment Damage (  ) l. Mx information system (entry or update) 
deactivated/reactivated (  ) a. Tools/equipment used improperly (  ) m. Time expired part on board aircraft 
(  ) g. Other (explain below) (  ) b. Defective tools/equipment used (  ) n. Tooling control 
(  ) c. Struck by/against (  ) o. Mx task not correctly documented 
3. Repair Failure (e.g., component or (  ) d. Pulled/pushed/drove into (  ) p. Not authorized/qualified/certified to do task 
structural repair) (  ) e. Fire/smoke (  ) q Other (explain below) 
(  ) a. Incorrect (  ) f. Other (explain below)
(  ) 9. Other (explain below) 
Describe the specific maintenance failure (e.g., auto pressure controller installed in wrong location).
MEDA Results Form Revision L 19 September 2013 
IV. Chronological Summary of the Event, including how some Contributing Factors lead to additional
Contributing Factors
V. Summary of Recommendations
MEDA Results Form Revision L 19 September 2013 
Section VI Contributing Factors Checklist 
A. Information (e.g., work cards, maintenance manuals, service bulletins, maintenance tips, non-routines,
illustrated parts catalogs, etc.)
__ 1. Not understandable __ 4. Too much/conflicting information __ 7. Information not used 
__ 2. Unavailable/inaccessible __ 5. Update process is too long/complicated __ 8. Inadequate 
__ 3. Incorrect __ 6. Incorrectly modified manufacturer's MM/SB __ 9. Uncontrolled 
__ 10. Other (explain below) 
Describe specifically how the selected information factor(s) contributed to the system failure. 
Recommendations to correct the Contributing Factors listed above. 
B. Ground Support Equipment/Tools/Safety Equipment
__ 1. Unsafe __ 6. Inappropriate for the task __ 11. Not used 
__ 2. Unreliable __ 7. Cannot use in intended environment __ 12. Incorrectly used 
__ 3. Layout of controls or displays __ 8. No instructions __ 13. Inaccessible
__ 4. Out of calibration __ 9. Too complicated __ 14. Past expiration date 
__ 5. Unavailable __ 10. Incorrectly labeled __ 15. Other (explain below) 
Describe specifically how selected ground support equipment/tools/safety equipment factor(s) contributed to the system 
failure. 
Recommendations to correct the Contributing Factors listed above. 
C. Aircraft Design/Configuration/Parts/Equipment/Consumables
__ 1. Complex __ 5. Parts/equipment incorrectly labeled __ 9. Consumable unavailable 
__ 2. Inaccessible __ 6. Easy to install incorrectly __ 10. Wrong consumable used 
__ 3. Aircraft configuration variability __ 7. Not used __ 11. Expired consumable used 
__ 4. Parts/equipment unavailable __ 8. Not user friendly __ 12. Other (explain below) 
Describe specifically how the selected aircraft design/configuration/parts/equipment/consumables factor(s) contributed 
to system failure. 
Recommendations to correct the Contributing Factors listed above. 
N/A __ 
N/A __ 
N/A __ 
MEDA Results Form Revision L 19 September 2013 
D. Job/Task
__ 1. Repetitive/monotonous __ 3. New task or task change __ 5. Other (explain below) 
__ 2. Complex/confusing __ 4. Different from other similar tasks 
Describe specifically how the selected job/task factor(s) contributed to the system failure. 
Recommendations to correct the Contributing Factors listed above. 
E. Knowledge/Skills
__ 1. Technical skills __ 4. Airline process knowledge __ 7. Teamwork skills 
__ 2. Task knowledge __ 5. Aircraft system knowledge __ 8. Computing skills 
__ 3. Task planning __ 6. English language proficiency __ 9. Other (explain below) 
Describe specifically how the selected knowledge/skills factor(s) contributed to the system failure. 
Recommendations to correct the Contributing Factors listed above. 
F. Individual Factors
__ 1. Physical health (including __ 5. Complacency __ 10. Visual perception 
 hearing and sight) __ 6. Body size/strength __ 11. Assertiveness 
__ 2. Fatigue __ 7. Personal event (e.g., family problem, car accident) __ 12. Stress 
__ 3. Time pressure __ 8. Task distractions/interruptions  __ 13. Situation awareness 
__ 4. Peer pressure __ 9. Memory lapse (forgot)   __ 14. Workload/task saturation 
__ 15. Other (explain below) 
Describe specifically how the selected individual factors contributed to the system failure. 
Recommendations to correct the Contributing Factors listed above. 
N/A __
N/A __  
N/A __
MEDA Results Form Revision L 19 September 2013 
G. Environment/Facilities
__ 1. High noise levels __ 5. Rain __ 9. Vibrations __ 13. Inadequate ventilation 
__ 2. Hot __ 6. Snow __ 10. Cleanliness __ 14. Markings 
__ 3. Cold __ 7. Lighting __ 11. Hazardous/toxic substance __ 15. Labels/placards/signage 
__ 4. Humidity __ 8. Wind __ 12. Power sources __ 16. Confined space 
__ 17. Other (explain below) 
Describe specifically how the selected environment/facilities factor(s) contributed to the system failure. 
Recommendations to correct the Contributing Factors listed above. 
H. Organizational Factors
__ 1. Quality of support from technical organizations __ 6. Work process/procedure 
(e.g., engineering, planning, technical pubs) __ 7. Work process/procedure not followed 
__ 2. Company policies __ 8. Work process/procedure not documented 
__ 3. Not enough staff __ 9. Work group normal practice (norm) 
__ 4. Corporate change/restructuring __ 10. Team building 
__ 5. Union action __ 11. Other (explain below) 
Describe specifically how the selected organizational factor(s) contributed to the system failure. 
Recommendations to correct the Contributing Factors listed above.
I. Leadership/Supervision
__ 1. Planning/organization of tasks __ 4. Unrealistic attitude/expectations __ 6. Amount of supervision 
__ 2. Prioritization of work __ 5. Does not assure that approved __ 7. Other (explain below) 
__ 3. Delegation/assignment of task  process/procedure is followed 
Describe specifically how the selected leadership/supervision factor(s) contributed to the system failure. 
Recommendations to correct the Contributing Factors listed above.
N/A __
N/A __
N/A __
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J. Communication
__ 1. Between departments __ 4. Between maintenance crew and lead __ 7. Other (explain below) 
__ 2. Between mechanics __ 5. Between lead and management 
__ 3. Between shifts __ 6. Between flight crew and maintenance 
Describe specifically how the selected communication factor(s) contributed to the system failure. 
Recommendations to correct the Contributing Factors listed above.
N/A __
